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LOCKHART v. McCREE: DEATH QUALIFICATION AS A
DETERMINANT OF THE IMPARTIALITY AND
REPRESENTATIVENESS OF A JURY IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
In Lockhart v. McCree I the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the exclusion from capital juries of persons who could never
vote to impose the death penalty does not unconstitutionally preju-
dice the verdict as to the defendant's guilt.2 The Court, voting six
to three,3 held that excluding such persons during jury selection
does not infringe upon the defendant's right under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community.
In so holding, the Court declined to expand the impartiality
and fair cross-section requirements to mandate a balance of atti-
tudes among the individual jurors. Accepting arguendo that death
qualification produces a jury that is initially more prosecution-
minded,4 the Court asserted that impartiality guarantees nothing
more than twelve jurors able to obey their oaths. The Court also
stated that the cross-section requirement was meant to apply only to
the list of people from which the jury is drawn, not to the jury itself.
Furthermore, the Court maintained that those excluded did not
constitute a distinctive or cognizable group for cross-section pur-
poses. Therefore, the states need not change their jury selection
procedures for death penalty cases. 5
1 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
2 A jury culled of individuals unable to impose capital punishment under any cir-
cumstances is referred to as a death-qualified jury. The questioning process by which such
individuals are identified is known as death qualification.
3 Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by ChiefJustice Bur-
ger and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred in the re-
sult. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
4 The Court noted several methodological problems with empirical studies em-
ployed by McCree. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-69. Nonetheless, the majority accepted
aiguendo the scientific validity of the empirical studies. The Court stated, "[W]e will
assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both methodologically valid and
adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more
'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified'juries." Id. at 1764. This Note adopts the
same assumption.
5 A ruling for McCree would have compelled states in which juries decide
sentences to use a completely bifurcated jury system in death penalty cases. Onejury,
which might include those unable to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances,
would vote on whether the defendant was guilty of the capital offense. Then, if the state
chose to ask for the death penalty, a second jury, excluding such individuals, would
make the sentencing decision. For a discussion of ways to implement a bifuracted sys-
tem, see infra note 161.
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As a foundation for analyzing the Court's decision in Lockhart, I
first discuss in the background section the major cases that develop
the constitutional requirements for jury selection. I show how the
cross-section requirement originated under the fourteenth amend-
ment in an effort to assure the participation of blacks in the jury
system. The scope of the cross-section requirement was broadened
in federal court cases to include other groups such as women and
Mexican-Americans under the sixth amendment doctrine of imparti-
ality. The sixth amendment was subsequently made applicable to
the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. Next I
show how the concept of a distinctive group emerged from the
cross-section cases without ever having been defined; the resulting
ambiguity in the definition was critical in the Lockhart decision. The
background discussion also considers the balancing of interests be-
tween the state and defendants that the court performs when con-
fronted with an infringement of the cross-section requirement.
Finally, I discuss the special jury selection requirements that
emerged from death penalty cases.
This Note argues that the Court correctly decided Lockhart and
that the decision preserved an important procedural corollary to the
implementation of states' death penalty laws. An examination of the
majority's reasoning shows that the Court correctly analyzed the
cross-section and impartiality issues. Even had the Court reached
different decisions on these threshold issues, however, the balance
of interests between the defendant and the state would have com-
pelled the same result. A contrary decision would force the aban-
donment of long established practices of peremptory challenges and
professional exemptions in jury selection. Moreover, the participa-
tion in a capital murder trial-even in the guilt phase-of individu-
als who would never vote for the death penalty could undermine the
integrity and viability of a state's death penalty laws.
I.
BACKGROUND
In Duncan v. Louisiana' the Supreme Court ruled that the sixth
amendment to the Constitution applied to the states as well as the
federal government. 7 As a result, every criminal defendant is enti-
6 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
7 Congress enacted the Bill of Rights to proscribe the powers of the federal gov-
ernment. These amendments did not bind state governments until the Supreme Court,
in a series of decisions, held that various provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to the
states through the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thus, after Duncan, the sixth amendment applied to the states by incorporation
into the fourteenth amendment.
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tled to ajury trial,8 whether tried in a state9 or federal court.10 The
Supreme Court subsequently ruled that certain jury selection proce-
dures developed in federal court cases under the sixth amendment
also applied to the states. Even before Duncan, however, a long line
of precedents based on the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment had developed requirements
concerning the use of juries in state courts.
A. The Content of the Right to a Jury Trial
The sixth amendment requires impartial juries.1' The Court
has interpreted "impartiality" as having a two-fold meaning. Pri-
marily, individual jurors must possess case-specific impartiality, that
is, they must have no personal biases concerning the specific case or
parties. 12 Second, the jury must be drawn from a representative
cross section of the community. 13 The Court has referred to this
cross-section requirement as "diffused impartiality," applying to the
jury in the aggregate rather than any singlejuror.14 The Court has
reasoned that the jury will more effectively hedge against the arbi-
trary power of the state if it reflects the full diversity of community
experiences and viewpoints.' 5
8 More accurately, the jury requirement applies to non-petty criminal offenses,
which are defined as those carrying sentences longer than six months. Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970).
9 Prior to Duncan, the states were not required to use juries in criminal cases,
although many did. The only requirement was that the trials provide due process and
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1279 (E.D. Ark.), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified, 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985)(en banc), rev'dsub nor. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
10 Federal trial courts have always used juries in criminal cases. Grigsby, 569 F.
Supp. at 1280 n.4.
11 "[Tjhe accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
12 Properly excluded jurors include: those who know the defendant or the victim,
those who have been victims of crime, and those who have relatives involved in police
work. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 246 n.5 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (8th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Insane persons,
jurors intimidated by the threat of mob violence, and jurors who have formed a fixed
opinion from newspaper or other media publicity also must be excluded. Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972). Prospective jurors may have some impression of the defend-
ant's guilt; however, he or she must lay it aside and render a decision based solely on the
evidence. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
13 "'Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of
the community as well as impartial in a specific case.' " Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting)).
14 " '[T~he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly
as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration
of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.'" Id at 530-31.
15 "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power ....
This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special
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1. The History of the Cross-Section Requirement as an Element of
Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Prior to Duncan in 1968, the fourteenth amendment served as
the sole source of any cross-section requirements for state court ju-
ries. Because the purpose of this amendment was to guarantee full
citizenship privileges to ethnic and minority groups,' 6 the cross-sec-
tion requirement developed as a vehicle to advance the equal pro-
tection interests of these groups. The first decision applying the
fourteenth amendment to jury selection held that an all-white jury
could not sentence a black man to death so long as a statute pre-
vented blacks from serving as jurors. 17 After that decision, the
Court repeatedly overturned criminal verdicts when members of
ethnic and minority groups were denied the opportunity to serve as
jurors. 18
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the scope of four-
teenth amendment jury requirements in two respects. First, the
Court held that the defendant need not belong to an excluded
group to object to the composition of thejury.' 9 Second, the Court
held that the composition of the venire20 must closely reflect that of
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool." Id.
at 530.
16 "In [Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)], the Court explained that
the central concern of the... Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to governmen-
tal discrimination on account of race." Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1716
(1986).
17 Strauder, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
18 See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-32 (1972) (increasingly dis-
proportionate reduction in number of blacks eligible for grand jury service at each stage
of selection process indicates discrimination and invalidates conviction); Arnold v.
North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964) (only one black juror serving on grand juries
in 24 years establishes primafacie case of discrimination and invalidates conviction); Hill
v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942) (failure of commissioners to seek qualified blacks for
grand jury service is discriminatory and invalidates conviction); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940) (systematic exclusion of blacks from grand jury service violates prohibition
against discrimination and invalidates conviction).
19 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (due process violated when white defendant
convicted in criminal trial by jury drawn from panel excluding blacks).
20 In selecting ajury, a court official draws up a list of prospective jurors, selecting
names in some random fashion. For example, lists of persons whose names begin with
certain letters of the alphabet, or whose birthdays fall in odd or even months, may be
chosen from the voting or tax rolls. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D.
Ark.), sta' granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc), rev'dsub. non Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). The people
on this list are known as the zenire, and the individuals on the list as veniremen. The
venire is then summoned to the courthouse, and the veniremen or prospective jurors
answer questions regarding their qualifications asjurors. Veniremen may be unfit jurors
in a particular trial for any of several reasons. See supra note 12. Excluding a venireman
for one of these reasons is exclusion for cause. Members of certain professions re-
garded as important to the community may also be exempted from jury service. See infra
note 184 and accompanying text. The opposing attorneys possess a certain number of
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the community as a whole.2' Thus, if the percentage of any minority
group in the venire is significantly lower than the percentage of that
group in the community, the verdict of ajury drawn from that venire
may be challenged.
2. Cross-Section Requirements as a Component of Impartiality
In 1975 the Court found in Taylor v. Louisiana22 that sixth
amendment impartiality included the cross-section requirement 23
when it overturned the conviction of a male defendant tried before
an all-male jury. The Taylor Court regarded the cross-section re-
quirement as essential to what it considered the purposes of a jury:
to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power and to maintain public
confidence in the criminal justice system.24
The Taylor decision has two significant aspects beyond its basic
holding. First, the Court emphasized a perceived need for particu-
lar attitudes and viewpoints that women bring to a case and the ef-
fect of women and their attitudes on the group dynamics of jury
deliberation.25 Second, the Court placed limits on the decision; the
language implied that the cross-section requirement applies only to
the venire and not to the petit jury.26 The Court stated that
peremptory challenges with which they can exclude prospective jurors not otherwise
excluded for cause. Attorneys base such challenges on how they believe the veniremen
might affect the verdict. But see discussion infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (ex-
clusion of blacks by peremptory challenge solely because of race unconstitutional). The
jury that results from this process is called the petit jury.
21 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1978) (jury venires less than 15%
female unconstitutional); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (50% Mexican-
American grand jury list not sufficient when county population 79% Mexican-Ameri-
can); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (jury selection system invalidated when
10% ofjury wheels female and population 53% female).
22 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
23 See supra notes 13-14. Before Taylor, the Court might have imposed the cross-
section requirement as part of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The sixth amendment does not refer to a cross-section requirement, stating only that
the jury be "of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Court's choice of the sixth amendment as a vehicle to bear
the cross-section requirement may have been motivated by the influence of a 13 year-old
precedent. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Court held that a system identical
to that in Taylor did not deny fourteenth amendment due process of law or equal protec-
tion. The Court distinguished Taylor from Hoyt by stating that Hoyvt was decided before
the incorporation of the sixth amendment in Duncan.
24 Taylo; 419 U.S. at 530.
251 " 'The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible ... [ and] the subtle interplay
of influence one on the other is among the imponderables .... [A] distinct quality is lost
if either sex is excluded.'" Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,
193-94 (1946)).
26 The majority concluded, "It should also be emphasized that in holding that petit
juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population." Id. at 538.
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although the cross-section requirements did not entitle defendants
to a jury of any particular composition, jury selection procedures
could not "systematically exclude distinctive groups in the commu-
nity." 27 Unfortunately, the Court failed to define the term "distinc-
tive group," presumably intending in future cases to develop the
term's meaning based on the objectives of the cross-section
requirement. 28
The Taylor Court emphasized preventing the exercise of arbi-
trary power and ensuring public confidence in the criminal justice
system,29 perhaps regarding these objectives as a complete list.
However, the Taylor Court quoted a passage from Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co. ,30 a case that one can read as stating an additional objec-
tive of the cross-section requirement: " 'IT]he broad representative
character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a
diffused impartiality andpartly because sharing in the administration
ofjustice is a phase of civic responsibility.' "31 One may regard the
objectives mentioned by the Court as subsumed under "diffused im-
partiality," which acts as a hedge against arbitrary power, protects
the individual rights of defendants, and, in turn, creates confidence
in the criminal justice system. The reference to "a phase of civic
responsibility" suggests that the definition of a "distinctive group"
is grounded partly in a societal interest involving the rights of citi-
zens to serve as jurors. This suggestion generates a problem in as-
sessing whether a group is distinctive, however, because the Court
failed to assign relative weights to the defendant's interest in a rep-
resentative jury and to the interests of the excluded group in full
citizenship. Taylor does not state whether an exclusionary practice
must infringe upon both sets of interests to be found unconstitu-
tional or if infringement upon either one alone is sufficient.
In cases such as Strauder v. West Virginia32 where the defendant
belonged to the excluded group, a natural unity of interest existed
between the rights of the defendant and the rights of those ex-
27 Id.
28 See id. at 530 (juries will not guard against the exercise of arbitrary power if large,
distinctive groups excluded from pool; inclusion of identifiable segments essential to
public confidence in fairness of criminal justice system).
29 See supra text accompanying note 24.
30 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (hourly-rate wage earners cannot be automatically ex-
empted from jury service).
3 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 (emphasis added) (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 227
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The "civic responsibility" phrase has always referred less
to a burden that needs to be borne than to a privilege of participation. "[E]xclusion of
Negroes from jury service injures not only defendants, but also other members of the
excluded class: it denies the class of potential jurors the 'privilege of participating
equally ... in the administration ofjustice.'" Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499 (1972)
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
32 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see supra text accompanying note 17.
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cluded. Taylor and Peters v. Kiff 3 established that this unity of inter-
ests is not necessary; however, these cases did not make clear
whether a defendant could demand the inclusion of some identifi-
able group when the exclusion had no negative implications for the
citizenship rights of that group. Language in Taylor and Peters sup-
port the interpretation that the defendant has a right to the most
broadly representative jury possible, and any group whose absence
would deprive the jury of particular viewpoints constitutes a distinc-
tive group.34
Nevertheless, groups identified as distinctive in Taylor and other
decisions3 5 correspond to suspect or quasi-suspect groups in equal
protection cases, 36 namely, blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans.
This correlation suggests an alternative view that the rights of the
33 407 U.S. 493 (1972); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
34 "Taylor, in the case before us, was similarly [referring to Peters] entitled to
tender and have adjudicated the claim that the exclusion of women from jury service
deprived him of the kind of factfinder to which he was constitutionally entitled." Taflor,
419 U.S. at 526.
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is ex-
cluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room quali-
ties of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.... Its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected impor-
tance in any case that may be presented.
Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04, quoted with approval in Ta'ylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12.
35 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text & note 21.
36 One possible exception is Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946),
where the Court held that hourly-rate wage earners could not be excluded from jury
service. Although the Court referred to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of
the community, the decision does not belong in the mainstream of modern cross-section
decisions for two reasons. First, the decision preceded both Duncan and Ta 'lor by more
than 20 years. Because Duncan was the first case to hold that "due process" in state
courts included sixth amendment guarantees, one cannot assume that the Thiel Court
considered the cross-section guarantee as the minimum guarantee of due process appli-
cable to the states. A second reason is that the decision was an exercise of the supervi-
sory power over the administration of federal courts. Id. at 225. The standards imposed
by the Court on the federal system can exceed the constitutional guarantees of the sixth
amendment that bind the states.
That the Court did not contemplate the application of the cross-section require-
ment to the states at the time of Thiel is clear from the following'passage:
These defendants rely heavily on arguments drawn from [Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946), and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)1 .... But
those decisions were not constrained by any duty of deference to the au-
thority of the State over local administration ofjustice. They dealt only
with juries in federal courts. Over federal proceedings we may exert a
supervisory power with greater freedom to reflect our notions of good
policy than we may constitutionally exert over proceedings in state
courts, and these expressions of policy are not necessarily embodied in
the concept of due process.
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947) (challenge, ultimately denied by court, to
selection of a special jury involving lack of proportional representation of laborers and
craftsmen in trial of labor union officials). A contemporaneous rejection of the Thiel
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excluded group are paramount, and defendants are rewarded for
bringing discriminatory exclusion to the attention of the federal
courts by having their guilty verdicts set aside. In this view, no dis-
tinctive group could exist absent some infringement of citizenship
rights of those excluded.3 7
Four years later in Duren v. Missouri3 8 the Court expanded and
systematized its holding in Taylor. Again, the Court clearly ex-
pressed its belief that any significant deviation in the percentage
composition of the venire from that of the community at large
would support a jury verdict challenge.39 Furthermore, the Court
requirements for the states further weakens the proposition that those requirements
should apply to a state court under the sixth amendment.
Not every doctrine enunciated by the Court concerning the sixth amendment cross-
section requirement was automatically incorporated by Duncan. Indeed, the cross-sec-
tion requirement was not formally applied to the states until Taylor, a case decided seven
years after Duncan. At least three justices of the Court maintain that the sixth amend-
ment has not been fully incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and that jury prac-
tice can differ between state and federal courts. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.).
Their position is supported by the Court's post-Duncan treatment of certain sixth
amendment guarantees. For example, interpretation of the sixth amendment before
Duncan clearly required a 12-person jury in serious criminal cases, Thompson v. Utah,
170 U.S. 343 (1898), and a unanimous verdict, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586
(1900). The Duncan Court equivocated on whether the states would be obligated to
comply with these interpretations. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968).
When the issues arose in the context of state court cases, however, the Court abandoned
both the 12-person requirement, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and the una-
nimity requirement, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). In Williams, Justice
Harlan argued that the incorporation of the sixth amendment had generated a dilemma
that required the dilution of sixth amendment guarantees as developed in the federal
system in order to allow the states flexibility in ordering their criminal systems. Williams,
399 U.S. at 117-33 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). His viewpoint was vigorously dis-
puted, however, by Justice Black. Id. at 106-07 (Black, J., concurring). Powell's notion
of incomplete incorporation could avoid Harlan's dilemma. In any event, given the
Court's treatment of pre-Duncan sixth amendment guarantees, one could not confidently
predict that Thiel's interpretation of the cross-section requirements would apply to the
states.
37 Even assuming Thiel is good precedent with regard to state trials, the thrust of
the argument is essentially unchanged: a defendant's interests alone may be insufficient
to create a distinctive group. The Thiel decision emphasized the "violence [done] to the
democratic nature of the jury system." Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223. The Court did not even
consider whether prejudice to the petitioner resulted from the exclusion. Id. at 225.
Clearly, the Court was attempting to uphold societal values in an effort to negate class
consciousness in the jury selection process. Id. at 224. Although achieving democratic
values may be a somewhat broader goal than upholding the rights of minority groups,
nothing indicates that a defendant's interest alone can define a distinctive group. See
Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (neither blue collar workers nor less edu-
cated individuals cognizable groups for cross-section purposes); Barber v. Ponte, 772
F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (young adults not distinctive group for cross-section purposes);
United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (young people, poorly
educated people, and unemployed people not cognizable classes).
38 439 U.S. 357 (1978).
39 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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outlined the elements of the prima facie case for a cross-section re-
quirement violation. A defendant challenging the jury verdict must
show
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process. 40
As in Taylor, the Court left the term "distinctive group" undefined.
3. Decisions Regarding Petit Juries
Two important Supreme Court decisions deal with petit jury re-
quirements. In Ballew v. Georgia,41 the Court held that a five-mem-
ber jury was too small to satisfy the "purpose and functioning" of
the jury.4 2 The Court based its decision on studies concluding that
juries of this size might promote inaccurate and possibly biased
decisionmaking, cause "untoward differences in verdicts," and pre-
vent juries from truly representing their communities. 43
The Court in Batson v. Kentucky 44 held that a prosecutor could
not use peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a petit jury on
the mere presumption that black jurors are unable to impartially
consider a case against a black defendant. 45 This decision, handed
down at approximately the same time as Lockhart,46 was based on
equal protection guarantees. 47 The Court applied the same equal
protection analysis to both phases ofjury selection, stating that the
discriminatory exclusion of blacks is unconstitutional whether prac-
ticed when selecting the venire48 or when selecting the petit jury.49
40 Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
41 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
42 Id. at 239.
43 Id. The Court mentioned three problems regarding the decisionmaking of five-
member juries: 1) less effective group deliberation; 2) inaccurate factfinding and incor-
rect application of the common sense of the community to the facts; and 3) reduced jury
size uniformly favors conviction. The Court also noted that a smallerjury is less likely to
remember all the important pieces of evidence and overcome the biases of its members.
Id. at 232-36.
44 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
45 Id. at 1723.
46 Lockhart was argued January 13, 1986 and decided May 5, 1986; Batson was ar-
gued December 12, 1985 and decided April 30, 1986.
47 Although the plaintiff framed his petition as a sixth amendment claim, the Court
declined to adopt this approach and analyzed the case on the basis of discrimination
against those excluded. Balson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716 n.4.
48 "The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not
exclude members of his race from thejury venire on account of race . I..." d. at 1717.
49 Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black
persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are
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4. Balancing State Interests
If a jury selection procedure infringes on the cross-section re-
quirement or the jury's purpose and function, then the Court deter-
mines whether the state's interests justify the infringement. When
analyzing a cross-section infringement, the Court considers whether
"a significant state interest [has been] . . . manifestly and primarily
advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process ... that re-
sult in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group." 50
When examining a purpose-and-function infringement, the Court
determines "whether any state interest counterbalances and justifies
the disruption [of the jury function] so as to preserve its constitu-
tionality."51 The cases reveal that states have difficulty proving a
significant state interest mostly because the Court takes a dim view
of administrative convenience and attendant cost savings as a
justification. 52
B. Jury Selection in Death Penalty Cases
The jury selection requirements of case specific and diffused
impartiality apply to all criminal prosecutions. Additionally, death
penalty cases have generated their own guidelines for jury selection.
Prosecutors may exclude from the jury anyone whose objections to
capital punishment might prejudice them against the state's case by
using statutorily- or judicially-based challenges for cause. 53 A small
unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to strike black ve-
niremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case
simply because the defendant is black.
Id. at 1723 (citations omitted).
50 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1978).
51 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 (1978).
52 In no case have such justifications for an infringement ever swayed the Court.
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 369 (" '[T]he administrative convenience in dealing with women as
a class is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community judgment repre-
sented by the jury in criminal trials.' " (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-
35 (1975))); Ballew, 435 U.S. at 243-44 (savings in court time and financial costs by re-
ducing jury from six to five persons insufficient justification).
53 The earliest death-penalty statutes imposed death automatically upon conviction
of a capital offense. Oberer, Does Disqualification ofJurors for Scruples Against Capital Punish-
ment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt? 39 TEX. L. REv. 544, 549-52 (1961).
Because the jury only determined guilt, states passed statutes disqualifying jurors who
had various degrees of objections to the death penalty. Id. These statutes were enacted
out of fear that such jurors would subvert the law by voting not guilty as a means of
defeating the death penalty. Later, however, states began to replace mandatory death
penalty laws with discretionary systems that allowed the jury to determine the appropri-
ate punishment. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752-53, 767-770 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (listing state statutes replacing mandatory death sentence
laws with jury discretion). The death-qualification statutes, however, remained in place.
Beginning in 1961, commentators began to argue that there was less justification for
death qualification in the context of discretionary systems, and that the process had neg-
ative implications for the integrity of the decision to convict. See generally Oberer, supra.
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line of Supreme Court cases established limits for such challenges
and raised new questions concerning the applicability of cross-sec-
tional analysis and the meaning of impartiality.
1. The Witherspoon Case
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,54 the appellant, Witherspoon, chal-
lenged an Illinois statute that allowed the exclusion for cause of
"any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscien-
tious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to
the same." 55 The prosecutor used the statute to exclude forty-seven
of ninety-five veniremen.56 The Court held that the resulting jury
was too inclined to return a sentence of death57 and did not meet
the impartiality requirement 58 with respect to the sentencing deci-
sion.59 The Court stated that excluding veniremen from juries in
death penalty cases for stating generalized scruples regarding the
54 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
55 Id. at 512 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959)).
56 Id. at 530 n.12 (Douglas, J., concurring in result).
57 "In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced
a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." Id. at 520-21.
58 "[IUn its role as arbiter of punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short
of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 518.
It is unclear what the Court meant in its reference to the sixth amendment. Duncan
was decided May 20, 1968 and Witherspoon onJune 3, 1968. Therefore the sixth amend-
ment guarantees normally would have been applicable. However, onJune 17, 1968, the
Court decided that Duncan should not apply to cases in which the trial began prior to
May 20, 1968. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633, 635 (1968). The DeStefano ruling
is somewhat anomalous with Jltherspoon which explicitly gave full retroactive effect to
the jury-selection requirements of IWitherspoon. H'itherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
Witherspoon arguably introduced some requirement of sixth amendment-type impar-
tiality into the due process clause. The above-quoted passage is the only reference to
the sixth amendment in the majority opinion. Other language in the opinion is equally
consistent with a due process analysis. Id. at 521 n.20, 523. A central line of reasoning
in 1ltlherspoon consisted of an extension of statements in previous due process cases. Id.
at 52 1. Thus, 'itlherspoon arguably was a fourteenth amendment case and the mention of
the sixth amendment was an off-handed reference.
Alternatively, the DeStefano Court may have intended only to limit the retroactivity
of a state's responsibility to provide a jury trial. In the event that a jury was utilized, the
Court may have intended the cross-section and impartiality requirements of Duncan and
ll'itherspoou to become generally applicable. But see-Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
358 (1972) (sixth amendment not applicable where defendant convicted of criminal of-
fense by non-unanimous jury verdict because Duncan decided after his trial began).
59 The Illinois courts used a partially bifurcated system in death penalty cases. The
jury would first make a determination of the defendant's guilt. Then, if the defendant
was found guilty, arguments and evidence would be heard regarding the imposition of
punishment with the punishment determined in a separate deliberation.
The Court did not find that thejury was unconstitutionally partial in the guilt phase,
only in the penalty phase. 1'litherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n.21. "Even so, a defendant
convicted by such ajury in some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury
was less than neutral with respect to guilt." Id. at 520 n.18.
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death penalty was unconstitutional, unless their reservations about
capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt, or the veniremen unequivocally
stated that they would never vote to impose the death penalty.60
Courts and commentators refer to veniremen who fall into one of
these two categories as "Witherspoon-excludables."6'
Witherspoon established the categories for including or excluding
jurors according to their attitudes regarding the death penalty and
laid the foundation for Lockhart. The first category of Witherspoon-
excludables may never participate in jury duty in a capital case be-
cause by definition they do not meet the constitutional standard of
impartiality. These jurors are called "nullifiers." 62 The second cat-
egory generates more controversy. Although these Witherspoon-ex-
cludables cannot participate in the sentencing phase of capital cases,
both courts and commentators have asserted repeatedly that these
jurors should be allowed to participate in the determination of
guilt. 63 A "scrupled" juror has general reservations about the death
penalty but acknowledges that death may serve as the appropriate
punishment in some cases. The effects of such reservations may dif-
fer: the juror may employ a heightened standard of review in the
guilt determination phase of the trial, or the juror may vote to im-
pose the death penalty only on the most outrageous set of facts.
Witherspoon establishes that as long as a scrupled juror can acknowl-
edge some set of circumstances under which the death penalty is
appropriate, he or she may not be excluded from the sentencing
phase of the trial. 64
60 Id at 520 n.18.
61 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1761 n.1.
62 Id. at 1764.
63 It is entirely possible, of course, that even a juror who believes that capi-
tal punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably commit-
ted to its abolition could nonetheless subordinate his personal views to
what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath as a juror and to
obey the law of the State.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514-15 n.7; see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1311,
1313 (E.D. Ark.), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modifed, 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'dsub noi. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986); W.
WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES 123 & n.234
(1984); Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Jivies After Adams v. Texas, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 219, 225-26 (1985) (asserting that careful voir dire procedure aimed at first
class of Witherspoon-excludables may solve jury nullification problem, thereby implying
that second class competent to judge the guilt issue); White, Death-QualifiedJuries: The
"Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reeaamihed, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 353, 399 (1980); Com-
ment, Capital Juries and the Fair Cross-Section Requirement: .Mlodern Constiutional Reasoning in
Juiy Selection, 73 Ky. L.J. 1109, 1110 n.7 (1984-85).
64 [Veniremen] cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indicate
that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recom-
mend capital punishment .... The most that can be demanded of a
venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties
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Although the Witherspoon Court was silent on the issue, there
are three conceivable bases for its finding of partiality. First, the
Court may have viewed the exclusion of any scrupled jurors as a di-
rect infringement 65 of the cross-section requirement because of the
defendant's inherent right to the benefit of such views in jury delib-
erations. Alternatively, the Court may have considered the whole-
sale exclusion of more than half the venire as an indirect
infringement of the cross-section requirement resulting from the se-
vere loss of community input. 66 Finally, the Court may have viewed
the imbalance in attitudes toward the death penalty as a collective
form of partiality, individual qualifications of the jurors
notwithstanding.
2. Subsequent Decisions Under the Witherspoon Doctrine
In Adams v. Texas 67 the Court refined the standard for exclusion
ofjurors in death penalty cases. The Adams Court examined a stat-
ute allowing the exclusion of veniremen from a petit jury unless
those veniremen could state that the prospect of a mandatory death
penalty would not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact.68 In
holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court found that to "ex-
clude all jurors who would be in the slightest way affected by the
prospect of the death penalty" would deprive the defendant of an
impartial jury.69 The Court stated that "a juror may not be chal-
lenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless
those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before
the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the
facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings.
H'itherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
65 A direct infringement occurs when an attorney sets out to exclude a particular
group from the jury and the viewpoints and characteristics of that group are lost in jury
deliberations. An indirect infringement may occur, even though no distinctive group is
excluded, if the size of the venire is drastically reduced. As the size of the jury panel
dwindles, it becomes less and less likely that the venire itself, much less the petit jury,
will represent a cross section of the community. See iifra note 131.
66 Arguably, in view of DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968), the Court
should not even have invoked the sixth amendment in l'itherspoon. See supra note 58.
"[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do
little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death." l'iitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. Justice Douglas
openly spoke of a constitutional right to a jury drawn from an impartial cross section of
the community. He ignored the fact that the Court had not applied the cross-section
requirement to the states at that time. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., concurring).
67 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
68 Id. at 42.
69 Id. at 50.
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oath." 70 The Adams standard is more easily satisfied than the Wither-
spoon standard for two reasons: 1) no unequivocal statement by the
prospective juror is required 7' and 2) a subjective factor is intro-
duced that allows exclusion based on "substantial impairment" of a
juror's duties. 72
II.
LOCKHART V MCCREE
The Witherspoon Court explicitly left open the question of
whether death qualification of juries unconstitutionally prejudices
the decision as to a defendant's guilt.73 Social scientists responded
with a number of statistical studies concluding that death qualifica-
tion produces ajury that is more prosecution-minded or guilt-prone
than a jury that includes Witherspoon-excludables. 74 Armed with
these studies, defendants challenged their capital murder trial ver-
dicts before various courts,75 contending that the guilt-prone jury
resulting from death qualification denied them their sixth amend-
70 Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
71 See supra text accompanying note 60.
72 The Court in TWainwright v. Witt recognized the shift in standards. 469 U.S. 412
(1985). The Wainwright Court stated that it preferred the Adams standard and that the
W1itherspoon standard was only dicta. Id. at 422. The Court further held that the determi-
nation of inability to serve on a capital jury should be made by the trial judge and that
this determination need not be stated unequivocally in the record, but is entitled to a
presumption of correctness. Id. at 426-35.
73 See supra note 59.
74 See Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-63 nn.4-6 (citing among others Cowan, Thomp-
son & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on
Qualit of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process
vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification andJuay Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984));
Goldberg, Toward Expansion of IVitherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jny Bias, and Use of Psychological
Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970); Jurow, New
Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified"Juvy on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 567 (1971); W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1964)
(unpublished manuscript); H. Zeisel, Some Data on juror Attitudes Toward Capital Pun-
ishment (1968) (University of Chicago Law School Monograph).
75 See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984) (exclusion in each of
three cases of "some" persons because they would not consider returning the death
penalty constitutional; exclusion ofjuror who said she was "not sure" if she could follow
law not an abuse of discretion); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 564-65 (11th Cir. 1983)
(exclusion of single juror who twice responded negatively when asked whether she could
impose death penalty did not deny defendant right to trial by impartial and representa-
tive jury), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.
1981) (exclusion of two veniremen unequivocally opposed to death penalty did not vio-
late defendants' constitutional rights), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (exclusion
of two veniremen unequivocally opposed to death penalty did not violate defendants'
constitutional rights), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th
Cir. 1976) (exclusion of thirteen of sixty-four veniremen did not deny defendant fair
trial; additional empirical evidence presented was inconclusive), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977).
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ment right to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the
community. In Lockhart v. McCree76 the Supreme Court resolved the
question left unanswered by Witherspoon.
A. The Proceedings
In 1978 Ardia McCree was convicted of capital felony murder in
an Arkansas court.77 The trial judge removed for cause eight pro-
spective jurors who stated that under no circumstances could they
vote to impose the death penalty.78 The jury rejected the state's re-
quest for a death penalty and instead imposed life imprisonment.
After exhausting his appeals in state courts, 79 McCree filed a
habeas corpus petition in federal court 80 claiming that the death quali-
fication of the jury violated his right to an impartial jury selected
from a representative cross section of the community. 8' In essence,
McCree claimed that a death-qualified jury is more likely to vote for
the prosecution during the guilt phase. 82
76 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
77 Id. at 1761.
78 Id.
79 McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 465, 585 S.W.2d 938 (1979) (en banc)(conviction af-
firmed on direct appeal); McCree v. State, No. CA 78-227, (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1980)
(petition for state post-conviction relief denied).
80 Lockhart at 1760. When a prisoner exhausts the appeals process in the state court
system, he may appeal to the federal court in the district in which his trial was held. He
must allege that a defect in his trial violated his constitutional rights and that he remains
incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. If
the district court agrees, it issues a writ of habeas corpus, instructing the state either to
retry the prisoner or free him. The federal court's decision may be appealed, first to the
federal circuit court of appeals, and perhaps to the United States Supreme Court. See
generallyJ. KAPLAN & R. WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1104 (1986).
81 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1761. The balance of McCree's habeas coipus claims were
rejected. McCree v. Housewright, No. PB-C-80-429 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 1982), af'd, 689
F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983).
82 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The habeas corpus petitions
ofJames T. Grigsby and Dewayne Hulsey were consolidated with McCree's. Grigsby v.
Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1276-1277 (E.D. Ark.), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D.
Ark. 1983), modified, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
The federal district court had tentatively concluded that Grigsby could not prevail
on the cross-section claim but held that the state trial court should allow him an oppor-
tunity to make an evidentiary showing to support the claim. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F.
Supp. 1372, 1388 (E.D. Ark.), modified, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980), later proceeding, Mc-
Cree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub non. McCree v. Lock-
hart, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983). Both sides appealed. The appeals court ordered the district
court, instead of the state court, to hold the evidentiary hearing and vacated the finding
of the district court on the cross-section claim. Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 528-29
(8th Cir. 1980), later proceeding, McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub nora. McCree v. Lockhart, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983). Grigsby's claim was then
consolidated with those of Hulsey and McCree. Grisgby, 569 F. Supp. at 1288-93.
Grigsby died in his cell before the district court opinion was announced. Grisby, 569
F. Supp. at 1276-77. Hulsey was prevented from raising the death-qualification issue
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The court found that death-qualified juries are more likely to
convict and concluded that McCree was unconstitutionally denied a
jury representing a fair cross section of the community.8 3 It there-
fore reversed McCree's conviction.8 4 The Eighth Circuit affirmed in
a five-to-four vote,8 5 thereby creating a conflict with other federal
circuits.8 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict.8 7
B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
1. Cross Section of the Community
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's view of the cross-sec-
tion requirement, stating that the cross-section requirement applies
to venires but not to petit juries.8 8 The majority reiterated Taylor's
mandate that no fixed composition is required in a petit jury 9 and
pointed out the practical impossibility of providing a truly represen-
tative petit jury to each defendant.9 0 The Court noted, " 'The point
at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross section of the commu-
nity is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are
drawn.' "91
The Court further stated that even if it extended the cross-sec-
tion requirement to petit juries, death qualification would not in-
fringe on that requirement because Witherspoon-excludables do not
constitute a distinctive group.9 2 The Court distinguished Wither-
spoon-excludables in two respects from distinctive groups identified
in previous cases. First, the Court asserted that the legitimate state
interest of having a single jury for both phases of a capital trial sup-
ports death qualification and does not skew the composition of capi-
tal juries.93 Second, the Court noted that death qualification does
not involve an attribute over which a juror has no control.94 Thus,
the Court contended that death qualification is consistent with the
because his attorney made no objection at the time the veniremen were excluded at trial.
Id. The court ruled on the death-qualification issue on McCree's behalf. Id.
83 Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1277.
84 Id. at 1324.
85 Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), revdsub noi. Lockhart
v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
86 See supra note 75.
87 Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
88 Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65 (1986).
8.) See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90 Lorkhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765; see hn'a note 131.
91 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725
(8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968)).
92 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
93 Id. at 1766.
94 Id.
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objectives of the cross-section requirement: guarding against the ex-
ercise of arbitrary power, preserving confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system, and ensuring the rights of disadvantaged groups to
serve on juries.95
2. Impartiality
Assuming arguendo that death qualification produces a more
conviction-prone jury,96 the majority denied that such ajury is par-
tial. The Court maintained that constitutional impartiality requires
only that each juror uphold the oath to apply the law conscientiously
and find the facts.97 It rejected a definition of partiality based on an
attitudinal imbalance among jurors98 as illogical because McCree
conceded that an identical jury resulting from the "luck of the draw"
would not violate the constitutional guarantee of impartiality. Fur-
thermore, the Court feared that such a definition would lead to the
hopelessly impractical task of balancing juries to reflect diverse life-
styles and viewpoints. 99
Rather than discuss the difference between the increased guilt-
proneness of a death-qualified jury and the unconstitutional partial-
ity that the Witherspoon Court found, the Court sought to distinguish
Lockhart on its facts from Witherspoon and Adams, thereby restricting
Witherspoon's precedential value.'00 The Court argued that Wither-
spoon and its progeny apply only to capital sentencing, where the
jury has unfettered discretion.' 0 ' In contrast, the Court felt that the
Lockhart jury, in finding facts and determining guilt or innocence,
had much less discretion.102
3. The State Interest
The majority's findings regarding the impartiality and cross-
section requirements obviated a thorough analysis of state inter-
ests.103 Nevertheless, the Court discussed one legitimate state inter-
95 Id. at 1765.
96 Id. at 1764-65; see supra note 4.
97 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1767.
98 Id. at 1770 ("In our view, it is simply not possible to define jury impartiality, for
constitutional purposes, by reference to some hypothetical mix of individual
viewpoints.").
99 Id. at 1767.
100 Id. at 1767-68.
101 Id. at 1769-70.
102 Id. at 1770.
103 Id. at 1768. Because the Court's holdings on the threshold issues precluded the
need to discuss the state interests more completely, one should not interpret the opin-
ion as an exhaustive treatment of the state's interests. The interest in a singlejury for
both phases of the trial is not the only interest or even the strongest interest that the
Court might have identified. This Note discusses state interests that the Court might
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est in order to distinguish Lockhart from Witherspoon and Adams. The
Lockhart Court regarded the unconstitutional jury selection systems
in Witherspoon and Adams as employing needlessly broad rules of ex-
clusion that lacked any neutral justification,' 0 4 a deliberate attempt
by the state to increase the likelihood of imposing the death pen-
alty. 10 5 In Lockhart, by contrast, the exclusions were limited to those
that were proper under Witherspoon and closely tailored to a legiti-
mate state interest: the maintenance of a single jury able to decide
both guilt and sentencing.'0 6
The Court argued that the legitimacy of this interest rested on
three considerations. First, states justifiably desire that a single jury
have unity of responsibility for both the guilt and sentencing phases
of a trial. Second, a defendant might benefit in the sentencing
phase from the jury's residual doubts as to his guilt. Finally, the
Court found that requiring a second presentation of significant
amounts of evidence unfairly burdens the state.10 7
C. The Dissenting Opinion
1. Witherspoon Analysis
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters, chose to ignore Mc-
Cree's cross-section claim' 0 8 and instead focused on the contention
that death qualification violated McCree's right to an impartial jury.
Although he conceded that no individual juror fell short of the stan-
dard for impartiality, 0 9 Justice Marshall argued that the attitudinal
imbalance or guilt-prone character of the jury amounted to an un-
constitutional advantage for the prosecution under Witherspoon." 10
2. Purpose and Function Argument
Justice Marshall argued alternatively that death qualification
contravened the purpose and function of a jury."'I He found that
social science studies demonstrated that death-qualified juries "are
likely to be deficient in the quality of their deliberations, the accu-
racy of their results, the degree to which they are prone to favor the
have considered if it had found any infringement of the sixth amendment guarantee. See
hfra section III(B).
104 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
105 Id. at 1768.
10(i Id.
107 Id. at 1768-69.
108 Justice Marshall dealt with the cross-section claim only in a footnote, arguing
that the desired effect of the cross section does not take place within a venire, but only in
a petit jury. Id. at 1775 n.6 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
10!) "Respondent does not claim that any individual on the jury that convicted him
fell short of the constitutional standard for impartiality." Id. at 1775.
110 Id. at 1775-76.
III Id. at 1777-79.
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prosecution, and the extent to which they adequately represent mi-
nority groups in the community."'" 2 He further noted that the
Court previously found these effects unacceptable in Ballew. 113
3. State Interest
In considering the legitimacy of the suggested state interest in
Lockhart, Justice Marshall recast the reasoning of the majority into
two rationales: efficient trial management and residual doubts." 4
He dismissed the first rationale by focusing on the cost element, and
stating that the costs of a completely bifurcated trial are not "pro-
hibitive or even significant." ' 15 He characterized the second justifi-
cation as "offensive" because he perceived it as disingenuous
reasoning by the Court. Justice Marshall considered the state's con-
cern for the defendant specious unless the defendant could waive
the potential benefits of residual doubts in exchange for a com-
pletely bifurcated trial." 16 He noted that states routinely empanel a
second jury to assess punishment when a defendant's sentence, but
not his conviction, is overturned on appeal." 17 Finally, Justice Mar-
shall observed that the Court consistently had refused to grant certi-
orari in state cases holding that juries could not consider residual
doubts in capital sentencing proceedings."l 8
III.
ANALYSIS
In this section I discuss five aspects of the Lockhart opinion.
First, I examine the validity of the Court's conclusion that death
qualification does not infringe the defendant's right to an impartial
jury drawn from a cross section of the community. Then I consider
the minority argument that death qualification detrimentally affects
the purpose and function of the jury, an argument to which the
Court did not respond. Third, I consider the full range of state in-
terests that would have been relevant had the Court reached the
balancing test. Fourth, I describe the probable effects of Lockhart in
112 Id. at 1778.
113 Id. at 1779 (citing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five person jury too
small to fulfill purpose and function ofjury)).
114 "The only two reasons that the Court invokes to justify the State's use of a single
jury are efficient trial management and concern that a defendant at his scntencing pro-
ceedings may be able to profit from 'residual doubts' troubling jurors who have sat
through the guilt phase of his trial." Id. at 1780-81.
115 Id. at 1781.
I 16 Id. at 1781-82.
117 Id. at 1781.
118 Id.
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capital murder trials. Finally, I evaluate the implications of the deci-
sion for future death penalty cases.
A. Preliminary Questions of Impartiality and Function
1. Impartiality
Whether death qualification introduces any jury partiality de-
pends on the definition employed. In the majority's view, "an im-
partial jury consists of nothing more than jurors who will
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' "119 The major-
ity120 and the dissent' 2' acknowledged that every juror in Lockhart
was so qualified. Therefore, no possibility of unconstitutional parti-
ality existed in Lockhart if one focuses only on individual jurors. 122
McCree, however, urged a definition of impartiality that consid-
ers the tendencies of a jury in the aggregate.' 23 In this view, the
whole becomes less than the sum of its parts when individuals hav-
ing certain attitudes are purged from the jury and are not present to
balance the attitudes of those remaining. At least one reading of
Witherspoon tends to support such a view of impartiality; if the Court
was not anticipating the incorporation of the cross-section require-
ment, it might have found the Witherspoon jury unconstitutionally
partial because of an attitudinal imbalance. 124 Under this view of
impartiality, the assumption of guilt-proneness made by the Lockhart
Court would compel a conclusion that the jury selection procedure
introduced some degree of partiality.
The majority noted that if the lack of certain attitudes leads to
partiality, then the absence of those attitudes resulting from "luck of
the draw" also should be unconstitutional. 25 One can argue, how-
ever, that the unconstitutionality arises not from random imbalance
but from state action that alters the random partiality in a manner
that advantages the state. 126 As Justice Marshall pointed out, the
119 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423
(1985) (emphasis added by Court).
120 Id.
121 See id. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 See supra'note 12 fora list of traditional, previously recognized bases for partiality
in a juror.
123 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
125 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1767. It is not obvious that a court has the latitude to allow
any partiality in any criminal prosecution, regardless of whether it occurs intentionally
or by accident. Although the state would have a legitimate interest in avoiding an intri-
cate task of balancing attitudes in a jury, this interest is not necessarily persuasive. As
Justice Black said in his famous dissent dealing with first amendment rights, "I do not
subscribe to [the balancing doctrine] for I believe ... that the men who drafted our Bill
of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done .... Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 61 (1961).
126 This is a plausible reading of what the IWitherspoon Court meant when it accused
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same twelve jurors might have been randomly drawn in Witherspoon;
it was the state action in excluding forty-seven of ninety-five venire-
men that generated the potential problem. 127
2. Cross Section of the Community
The Lockhart Court correctly found that the right to a fair cross
section of the community applies only to a venire, and not a petit
jury. Although requirements for the venire clearly influence the
makeup and workings of petit juries, 28 other considerations
demonstrate that the cross-section requirement should not apply to
a petit jury. First, the language of Duren v. Missouri 129 indicates that
the cross-section requirement only applies to jury venires. To prove
a cross-section violation, a defendant must show "that the represen-
tation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity." 30 Second, from a statistical standpoint, a twelve-person jury
cannot possibly reflect the same distribution of characteristics as the
population from which it is drawn.' 3 1 Finally, exclusions for cause,
exemptions from jury duty, and peremptory challenges at voir dire
inevitably disrupt any semblance of a cross section that might result
the state of "stack[ing] the deck against the petitioner." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
127 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
128 "The right to have a particular group represented on venires is of absolutely no
value if every member of that group will automatically be excluded from service as soon
as he is found to be a member of that group." Id. at 1775 n.6.
129 439 U.S. 357 (1978).
130 Id. at 364 (emphasis added); see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
131 In statistical parlance, the people living in a given community in which the crime
is committed would be known as a population. The various descriptive characteristics of
these people, such as age, income level, and varying degrees of skepticism or receptivity
to a given idea, would be distributed in some pattern about the mean value for each
characteristic. Both the venire and the petit jury represent samples drawn from the
population.
Although the Court fails to explicitly define the term "cross section," a statistically
meaningful interpretation is that the distribution of values for each characteristic in the
sample resembles that of the overall population. Assume that a given characteristic,
income level for example, is normally distributed in the population. One can determine
the sample size required to predict within a given statistical confidence level that the
sample's mean income will be within a given dollar figure of the mean income of the
population.
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from the random selection of a petitjury.132 Moreover, because ap-
plication of the cross-section requirement to the venire fulfills the
requirement's purposes, no reason exists to extend the cross-sec-
tion requirement to the petit jury. The inclusion of large distinctive
groups in the venire satisfies the objective of hedging against the
arbitrary power of the state.133 The prosecutor must prepare a case
for presentation to a broadly representative jury because he cannot
control completely the selection process or assume any predisposi-
tion on the part of the jury. The application of the cross-section
requirement to the venire also adequately upholds egalitarian values
of full citizenship.134 Fulfilling these two objectives should maintain
The following equation shows this relationship:
n = (Z(c/2))2 0-
where:
n = sample size
Z(c/2) = distance from the mean for a standard normal distribution
curve that includes some fraction "c" of the total probability
(also represents statistical confidence level)
a = standard deviation of the population, a measure of the
variability about the mean of the variable in question
L = maximum desired interval between population and sample
means
See generally T. DYCKMAN & L. THOMAS, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND Eco-
NOMICS 352-55 (1977).
Suppose the mean income level for the county is $15,000 with a standard deviation
of $4,500. Using a normal distribution, this would mean that 99% of the incomes in the
county would fall between $1,500 and $28,500. To be 90% certain that the mean in-
come of the sample would be within $1,500 (10%) of the mean income of the county (a
rather modest expectation) requires a sample of approximately 25 persons. This is de-
termined by the following calculation:
C = .90, Z(c/2) = Z (0.45) = 1.645, L = 1500,
a = 4500
n = (1.645)2 (4500)2 = 24.3 or 25
(1500)2
Clearly, the required sample size for any statistically meaningful notion of cross-
section could not be achieved in a twelve member petit jury, although it could be
achieved in the venire. Of course, considerations such as the level of skepticism to an
idea are more relevant to ajury's deliberation than income levels, and there is no reason
to believe that these will be normally distributed in the population.
Thus the notion that juries represent the community is valid only when the process
is viewed over several trials. However, from a statistical standpoint, diffused impartiality
exists in the venires, and case-specific impartiality results from the legal process of ex-
clusion to obtain a petit jury.
132 See i'fra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 24.
1:34 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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public confidence in the criminal justice system.13 5
Thus, death qualification does not infringe on the cross-section
requirement because the Court properly limited the applicability of
the requirement to venires. However, if the Court had extended
the cross-section requirement to petit juries, one could argue that
Witherspoon-excludables constitute a distinctive group and that death
qualification would infringe on the expanded cross-section require-
ment. The Taylor Court stated that cross-section requirements are
supported by a combination of a defendant's rights to dispersed im-
partiality and societal interests in full citizenship. 3 6 The Lockhart
Court obviously focused on citizenship interests to limit the pos-
sibilities for defining a distinctive group. It listed "civic responsibil-
ity" as a full-fledged objective of the cross-section requirement.13 7
The majority argued that groups defined solely by shared attitudes
differ from the distinctive groups that the Court had recognized in
the past. 138 The chief difference between Witherspoon-excludables
and traditional distinctive groups is that exclusion of the former im-
plies no general infringement of citizenship rights or democratic
values. 139
The policy decision that the Court made with respect to distinc-
tive groups is legitimate, but not self-evident or inevitable. The
Court might just as reasonably have emphasized defendants' inter-
ests more strongly by finding that Witherspoon-excludables are a dis-
tinctive group.
Several factors support such a determination. First, the charac-
teristics of the group excluded by death qualification comports with
two objectives underlying the cross-section requirement. 140 The in-
clusion of a group that is skeptical toward the prosecution's case
135 See infra note 137.
136 See supra note 14.
137 The Court listed the objectives of the cross-section requirement as 1) guarding
against the exercise of arbitrary power and ensuring that the common sense judgment of
the community will act as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor;
2) preserving public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system; and 3) im-
plementing our belief that sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765. Justice Rehnquist's list elevated the Ta V/or
dicta concerning "civic responsibility" to the level of a third factor in determining the
existence of distinctive groups. Taylor explicitly lists only two functions of ajury, which
are implicated in the cross-section requirement. See supra text accompanying note 24.
138 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765-66;seesupra notes 16-18 & 21 and accompanying text.
139 Justice Rehnquist emphasized this point when he stated that death qualification
is not exclusion based on an immutable characteristic or unrelated to the ability of these
individuals to serve. He noted that death qualification does not prevent ll'itherspoon-
excludables from serving as jurors in other criminal cases. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765-
66.
140 Id. at 1765; see supra note 137. These are the two original requirements estab-
lished by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see spra text ac-
companying note 24.
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more effectively hedges against an overzealous prosecutor or the ex-
ercise of arbitrary power. 14 1 Also, exclusion of such a group under-
mines the public confidence in the criminal justice system if people
perceive that such exclusion creates an unfair advantage for the
state. 142
Second, one purpose of the cross-section requirement has al-
ways been to ensure that certain attitude patterns are not excluded
from a jury. Indeed, both the Taylor143 and Duren 144 Courts sought
to ensure the inclusion of women's attitude patterns. Although
cases involving exclusion of women, blacks, and Mexican-Americans
had equal protection overtones, most of these cases also involved
claims of the defendant's right to a representative jury. 145 The main
benefit that a defendant gains by the inclusion of any group in the
jury is the resulting difference in attitude toward the defendant and
toward the prosecution's case.
Finally, the empirical studies before the Court contended that
death qualification falls disproportionately on blacks and women. 146
If true,147 death qualification infringes on the right of these groups
141 "Death-qualified jurors are, for example, more likely to believe that a defend-
ant's failure to testify is indicative of his guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more
mistrustful of defense attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous con-
victions." Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1772 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 The majority admitted that exclusion on the basis of some immutable character-
istic gives rise to an appearance of unfairness, implying that death qualification would
not create an impression of unfairness because it is directly related to ajuror's ability to
serve. Id. at 1766. If death qualification were seen as a device for "stacking the deck"
against defendants, however, an appearance of unfairness could still result. The inclu-
sion of H'itherspoon-excludables could also undermine public confidence in the criminal
justice system, however, if it is perceived as a device for undermining death penalty laws
favored by a large segment of the population. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying
text.
143 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531-32.
144 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 372 (unnumbered footnote) (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (summarizing Court's position).
145 See cases cited supra notes 16-19 & 21. In all of the cited cases, defendants sought
to overturn their convictions based on the composition of their juries. Injunctive relief
is also available to the excluded parties. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S.
320 (1970).
146 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1779 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Grigsby v. Mabry,
569 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 n.3, 1283 (E.D. Ark.), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark.
1983), modified, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985)(en banc), rez'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
147 The Court did not accept this contention as part of its assumption, see supra note
4, so it might require proof by empirical evidence. However, the assertion is consistent
with the general attitude patterns of these groups regarding the death penalty. As of
1985, women favored the death penalty by a margin of 67% to 24%; men favored it by a
margin of 78% to 16%. The discrepancy between blacks and whites is even more pro-
nounced. Blacks favored the death penalty by a margin of only 57% to 35%, as com-
pared to whites who favored it 75% to 18%. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS-1985 178 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter SOURCEBOOK].
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to participate in the jury process and the right of capital defendants
to have the views of these groups represented on the jury. These
groups might fulfill the distinctive group requirement the Court
considered absent.
3. Purpose and Function
The dissent argued that the statistical studies on death qualifi-
cation presented in Lockhart 148 raise many of the same concerns
raised by a reduction in jury size:149 inaccurate decisionmaking, in-
consistent verdicts, and ineffective representation of the commu-
nity.1 50 The question is whether the negative impacts of death
qualification on jury deliberation are as significant as those caused
by a five-person jury.
The analogy between reductions in jury size and death qualifi-
cation has serious difficulties. First, the Lockhart Court only assumed
the statistical conclusion regarding the conviction-proneness of
death-qualified juries.' 51 The Court would need to examine the
methodological and statistical bases of this contention. Second, the
Ballew Court's analysis regarding the unconstitutionality of a five-
person jury does not apply in other situations. 152 The Ballew Court
neither weighted the factors enumerated nor provided any scheme
for assessing those factors in any other factual situations. In holding
148 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
150 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (Marshall,J., dissenting); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 111-13.
151 See supra note 4. The statistical conclusions pertaining to Marshall's Ballew analy-
sis do not appear in every study cited by McCree. The conclusions Marshall employed
are peripheral findings raised in one or two studies. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1778 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Although all the studies conclude that death-qualified juries are
more guilt-prone, only the Fitzgerald & Ellsworth and Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth
studies, supra note 74, explore the question ofjuror biases resulting from the cluster of
attitudes noted by Marshall. Only the Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth study deals with
the recall of evidence and the rigor with which the evidence is tested. Cowan, Thomp-
son & Ellsworth, supra note 74, at 75-76. Only two studies provide evidence of the dis-
proportionate impact on blacks and women. See White, supra note 63, at 387-89 (cited
by Marshall as support for this contention). Such limited evidence is hardly conclusive.
152 Justice Blackmun, the author of the plurality opinion in Ballew, concurred with-
out comment in the Lockhart result. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1770. Presumably, if the
Ballewp analysis properly applied to this case Blackmun would have been discussed it.
Furthermore, in the eight years since the Ballew decision, the analytical framework of
Ballewv was employed only once before Marshall's dissent in Lockhart. This was in the
very closely related case of Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 331 (1980), which in-
volved a non-unanimous verdict of a six man jury. The essential logic of the Brown
decision is that the sixth man added nothing to remove the taint described in Ballew,
because the sixth man disagreed with the other five. The Court cited the Ballew case
only 12 times before Lockhart, mostly for its holding regarding scienter. Such a pattern
does not reveal an intent by the Court to use Ballew as a general precedent with wide-
spread implications.
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unconstitutional the combined effect of all the factors present, the
Ballew Court drew a necessary line.153 Although Ballew produced a
correct result, the analysis employed there does not extend beyond
the narrow factual context of the case.' 54
The general conclusion drawn from Ballew is that only the most
extreme practices of jury formulation interfere with the jury's pur-
pose and function. Prior to Ballew, the Court allowed the states to
reduce the size of the jury to six persons;155 this decrease certainly
affects the representativeness of the jury and its group dynamics.
However, only when Georgia attempted a further reduction did the
Court decide that the cumulative effects on the jury were unconsti-
tutional.1 56 In the most recent death-qualification cases, the
number of jurors excluded has been relatively small compared to
the venire size. 157 Therefore, the effects of death qualification are
too insignificant to render it unconstitutional under the Ballew
Court's analysis.
B. The State's Interest
1. The Majority Argument
The Court confined its analysis to the state interest in obtaining
a single jury that can impartially decide both guilt and penalty in a
capital case.' 58 This interest encompasses administrative advan-
tages, unity of responsibility in a jury, and the possible benefit of
residual doubts. 159 These reasons arguably do not provide the sub-
stantial state interest necessary to justify an infringement of a consti-
tutional right. If the Court had ruled for McCree, the state would
have been compelled to conduct the guilt determination and the
penalty phase of some death penalty trials with two distinct groups
ofjurors. Arguments based on administrative difficulties are unper-
suasive' 60 because no one has shown that such a bifurcated system is
153 "[Ihe line between five- and six-member juries is difficult to justify, but a line
has to be drawn somewhere if the substance ofjury trial is to be preserved." Ballen, 435
U.S. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
154 "[lit would be foolish to assume that the [Ballew] majority's mode of analysis,
undoubtedly shaped to some extent by the special characteristics of the issue before it,
can be easily applied to other situations in which proof of an empirical proposition may
have constitutional significance." W. WHITE, supra note 63, at 113.
155 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
156 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
157 See supra note 75.
158 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
159 Id. at 1768-69.
160 If the state had to present all or substantially all the evidence to a second jury,
however, an interesting possibility arises. Could the second jury decide that the defend-
ant was not guilty and therefore refuse to impose any sentence? If so, what happens
then? Is a third jury empaneled for the purpose of passing sentence, or is the entire trial
repeated?
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either unworkable or unduly costly.161
The Court accepted the state's argument that a single jury
should have responsibility for both the guilt and the penalty phases
because the two questions are interwoven. 162 The Court also felt
that a division of responsibility between two groups would dilute
accountability and disadvantage the accused.' 63 Some jurors may
be more guilt-prone if another group is responsible for the sentenc-
ing. 164 However, the countervailing tendencies of the Witherspoon-
excludables, who are less guilt-prone, would also be present. The
combination of these factors would have an uncertain net effect on a
defendant's position when compared with the present unitary
system.
The Court also argued that during sentencing a defendant
might benefit from the jurors' "residual doubts" concerning his
guilt, even though those jurors have pronounced him guilty.' 65
This benefit disappears if a new jury imposes the penalty. The pros-
ecution, however, must prove each element of its case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt,1 66 and it is difficult to say whether the residue of
unreasonable doubts ever accumulates into a refusal to impose capi-
tal punishment. Even acknowledging the possibility of residual
doubts, the state could reduce the importance of residual doubts in
a bifurcated system.' 67 For example, the number of individuals
common to both juries and the completeness of the evidence
presented to the penalty jury would affect the impact on the
defendant.
2. Commonly Accepted Juy Selection Procedures
The state has a stronger interest in upholding the policies and
161 The Eighth Circuit suggested that the Court could qualify an alternatejuror for
each II'itherspoon-excludable juror. Both jury and alternates would sit in the trial during
the guilt phase. If the defendant is convicted of a capital offense, the alternates would
merely replace the 11'itherspoon-excludables in the penalty determination. See Grigsby v.
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rez'd sub non. Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Other possibilities for avoiding duplication of effort include
empaneling a second death-qualified jury at the start of every trial, Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at
1781 (Marshall,J., dissenting); stipulated summaries of prior evidence, id.; and videotap-
ing the guilt phase of the proceeding and showing material portions of this videotape to
the new penaltyjury, W. WHITE, supra note 63, at 124.
162 Lorkhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1768.
163 See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d at 247 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
164 "When one jury hears both phases of the case, the jurors that comprise it cannot
evade the heavy responsibility placed upon them of whether a convicted person should
receive the death penalty." Id.
165 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1769.
166 In re llinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
16'7 The alternatejuror method discussed supra note 161 would not hinder the effects
of residual doubts.
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objectives of ordinary jury selection procedures in criminal trials.
Holding death qualification unconstitutional would threaten the use
of both peremptory challenges and occupational exemptions. Per-
emptory challenges, occupational exemptions from jury duty, and
death qualification all change the otherwise random composition of
the petit jury. Under the analytical framework of the Lockhart dis-
sent, this alteration could amount to unconstitutional state action if
the excluded group possessed a demonstrable coherence of atti-
tudes. 168 Under the dissent's cross-section analysis, this coherence
of attitudes could define a distinctive group protected from exclu-
sion. Under the dissent's impartiality analysis, the Court could find
unconstitutional jury partiality if the attitudes of those excluded or
excused were more favorable to the defendant than those of the re-
sulting jury.
A prosecutor's peremptory challenges, 169 in the very nature of
the practice, would alter the attitude pattern of the jury in favor of
the prosecution. 170 There is no material difference between remov-
ing a Witherspoon-excludable for cause or by peremptory chal-
lenge. 7 1 Either way, the prosecutor removes a juror that may be
168 Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
169 "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's con-
trol." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
170 "The peremptory [challenge] is employed by each party to eliminate those indi-
viduals most likely to be hostile whose prejudice cannot be proved to the judge's satis-
faction." Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE LJ.
1177, 1180 (1980).
171 To get some feel for the number of peremptories needed to purge completely a
12-person jury of Witherspoon-excludables, assume (based on the data in infra note 193)
that J1therspoon-excludables constitute about 15% of the venire. The prosecutor wants a
jury of 12 with no W1itherspoon-excludables. If a IVitherspoon-excludable is selected, the
prosecutor may exercise a peremptory. The exact calculation of the probability of ob-
taining ajury with no W itherspoon-excluables by using a given number of peremptories is
mathematically complex. A reasonable approximation may be obtained, however, by
considering a randomly selected group of 16 veniremen, from which a 12-person jury is
to be chosen. The probability (p) that the group of 16 contains a given number of Tither-
spoon-excludables is readily calculable.
Given n trials of a process which can have only one of two outcomes, the probability
of exactly x successes is given by
b(x: n, p) - n!
x! (n-x)! p' (l-p)-'
where:
n = number of trials
x = number of successes
p = probability of a success on a single trial.
See T. DYCKMAN & L. THOMAS, supra note 131, at 243. Thus, the probability of obtaining
a jury containing a given number of T1itherspoon-excludables (WE's) is as follows:
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unsympathetic to the prosecution's case.172 The logic of the Lock-
hart dissent could lead to the elimination of peremptory challenges
in capital murder trials. However, peremptory challenges have a
time-honored place in trial practice 73 and actually further jury im-
partiality. 174 Their elimination in pursuit of another form of impar-
tiality involves a tradeoff that is difficult to assess.
Occupational exemptions t75 similarly may alter collective atti-
tude patterns in a jury, depending upon the statistical correlation of
p (zero WE's) = .0742 p (three WE's) = .2285
p (one WE) = .2097 p (four WE's) = .1311
p (two WE's) = .2774
and p (four or fewer WE's) = .9209 (the sum of all the above figures).
Thus, even four peremptories will give a prosecutor better than a 90% chance of
obtaining a death-qualified-equivalent jury, given the current distribution of attitudes in
the general population. This is not a significant burden on the prosecution's perempto-
ries. Under federal rules, followed in some states, each side has 20 peremptories in
capital cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
172 Any effort to allow the peremptories, but restrict their use to exclude Witherspoon-
excludables, would be futile. Prospective jurors must be questioned about their atti-
tudes toward the death penalty to determine if they are nullifiers. Once the attitude of a
venireman towards the death penalty is revealed, a prosecutor could find another facially
neutral reason to exclude thejuror. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1728 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
173 For a discussion of the history of peremptory challenges from their earliest be-
ginnings in English law, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965).
174 Peremptory challenges legitimately facilitate the efforts of both sides to achieve
the constitutional guarantee of impartiality in a jury. Its justifications are threefold.
First, it allows an attorney to act on an impression or conviction that a juror is biased
which arises from looks, gestures, or something else in the demeanor of the venireman.
Id. at 220. These impressions usually would not fall within legally cognizable grounds
for cause. Without peremptory challenges, a defendant would have no choice but to
accept a juror who had been scowling at him if his attorney's questions could not dis-
cover a basis for cause. Second, the very process of questioning a juror to discover
cause can generate resentment in that juror, which is readily perceived but not easily
proven. Id. Third, ChiefJustice Burger quoted with approval the following statement:
The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in
the core of truth in most common stereotypes.... [Ilt is likely that cer-
tain classes of people statistically have predispositions that would make
them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But to allow this
knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms necessary for chal-
lenges for cause would undercut our desire for a society in which all peo-
ple are judged as individuals and in which each is held reasonable....
[W]e have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the
covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often
than not.
Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1735-36 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Babcock, I'oir Dire: Pre-
serving "Its Ionderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553-54 (1975)).
175 The system used by the State of Missouri in Duren is one example. "[T]he follow-
ing are exempted from jury service upon request: persons over age 65, medical doctors,
clergy, teachers, . . . 'any person whose absence from his regular place of employment
would, in the judgment of the court, tend materially and adversely to affect the public
safety, health, welfare or interest' ....... Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 361 n.10
(1978) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.031 (Supp. 1978) regulatingjury selection).
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attitudes within professions. The Duren Court found automatic ex-
emptions for women unacceptable because women possess view-
points and attitudes that could not be excluded from a jury. 176 In
Lockhart the defendant argued that opposition to the death penalty
correlated to many other attitudes favorable to his case that could
not be excluded from ajury by the process of death qualification. 177
A statistical demonstration that employment in certain professions
correlated with attitudes favorable to a defendant 7 8 would make an
automatic exemption for such professions as unconstitutional as the
exemption for women in Duren.
Although the Duren Court indicated that occupational exemp-
tions would survive constitutional scrutiny, 179 it also stated that the
176 The Court noted that only two states had maintained an automatic exemption for
women and stated that such systematic exclusion violated the fair cross-section require-
ment. Id. at 359-60.
177 See supra note 141. "McCree contends that, by systematically excluding a class of
potential jurors less prone than the population at large to vote for conviction, the State
gave itself an unconstitutional advantage at his trial." Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1775 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
178 Sympathy with a defendant's case may be correlated with educational level or
profession. Most college-educated professionals can obtain professional exemptions.
The following passage illustrates some of the correlations between professions and juror
attitudes that defense attorneys might allege:
An area most reliably interpreted is that of a man's work. Businessmen,
particularly shop owners and bankers, invariably good defense jurors in
civil cases, in the criminal courts often show prosecution bias, especially
in instances of crime against property. People in "liberal arts" fields such
as teaching, or in the helping professions (nurses, social workers), are
usually willing to look past the hard facts and into mitigating circum-
stances associated with them, and thus may be well-attuned to defense
arguments.
An overriding consideration, however, when evaluating prospective
jurors by occupation, is the vocational identities of key witnesses and liti-
gants themselves. Workers in the same field usually "talk the same lan-
guage"; a "hard hat" juror is likely to be attuned and sympathetic to a
"hard hat" witness, and a geneticist to another geneticist, regardless of
which side his testimony may fall.
Individuals whose occupations involve fine, detailed work, and who,
in the criminal court, respond better to the orderly laying down, piece by
piece, of the prosecutor's evidence than to the defense attorney's broad
brush work, will also tend to focus on the inevitable flaws in the plaintiff's
case, rather than see it in the overview. Accountants and "engineering
types" particularly will be preoccupied with cognitive detail and are pro-
portionately insensitive to the human/emotional factors. Retired military
men have a strong authority/law-and-order bias, identify with the state in
criminal cases, and can be relied upon in personal injury litigation to be
strict, ungenerous and impatient with free-wheeling, emotional plaintiff
attorneys. Athletes also tend to lack sympathy for the fragile plaintiff.
Cabbies, by contrast, are generally good plaintiff jurors, although they
have an abiding dislike of pedestrians, injured or not.
Blinder, PickingJnries, I TRIAL DIPL.J. 8, 9 (1978). See generally M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY
IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 1982).
179 "[M]ost occupational and other reasonable exemptions [are not of sufficient mag-
nitude and distinctiveness to violate the cross-section requirement]. We also repeat the
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omission of a group of sufficient size and distinctiveness could vio-
late the Constitution.18 0 Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that
the juxtaposition of these two statements posed a dilemma for dis-
trict attorneys wishing to avoid reversal and predicted it would lead
to the abandonment of occupational exemptions.' 8 1 If the Lockhart
Court had defined attitudes as a measure of distinctiveness, 82 then
Justice Rehnquist's fears might have materialized.'
8 3
Occupational exemptions protect a community's interest and
minimize the burdens of jury duty to private citizens.' 84 There is a
temptation to minimize the importance of the cost of jury duty to
private citizens when compared to the interest a defendant has at
stake in a capital murder trial. If forcing jury duty on a professional
person yields a hostile and sullen juror, however, jury impartiality
may be compromised.' 85
observation made in Taylor that it is unlikely that reasonable exemptions, such as those
based on special hardship, incapacity or community needs, 'would pose substantial threats
that the remaining pool of jurors would not be representative of the community.'"
Duren, 439 U.S. at 370 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975)) (empha-
sis added); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534 ("The States are free to grant exemptions from
jury service.., to those engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted perform-
ance of which is critical to the community's welfare." (citing Rawlins v. Georgia, 201
U.S. 638 (1906))).
180 Duren, 439 U.S. at 370.
181 Id. at 377 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182 See supra text accompanying note 112.
183 See Sweet v. United States, 449 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1982) (cross-section challenge on
the issue of occupational exemptions). In Sweet, the court found that there was under-
representation of six occupations due to the systematic exclusion of persons in those
occupations from jury service. The court held that the distinctive group prong was not
met, however, because the evidence failed to show a cohesiveness of attitude or a com-
munity of interests not represented by others in society. An array of statistical studies
establishing an occupational "cohesiveness of attitude" insufficiently represented by
others, see supra note 178, presumably could satisfy the distinctive group prong had Lock-
hart been decided differently.
184 The purposes of occupational exemptions are at least two-fold. The Taylor Court
referred to the first purpose: there are certain professions "the uninterrupted perform-
ance of which is critical to the community's welfare." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534; see supra
note 179. The second is expressed in a federal statute that sets the standard for occupa-
tional exemptions in the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5) (1982). The
statute requires a finding by the district court that jury service by the occupational or
other group would entail "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience to the members
thereof .. " Id. The House report on the act lists doctors, ministers, sole proprietors
of businesses, and mothers with young children as probably satisfying this requirement.
H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 1792, 1800. In United States v. Goodlow, 597 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1979), the
court extended the exemption to teachers, attorneys, pharmacists, nurses, and dentists
on the basis that "members of all of these occupational groups may have difficulty find-
ing adequate temporary substitutes when they leave their work or their practices, or may
incur extra work or financial losses even if substitutes are obtained." Id. at 161.
185 Presumably the "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience" criteria, see supra
note 184, would require evaluation on an individual basis. It is unlikely that kidney
transplant specialists would be compelled to serve as jurors, even in the special situation
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
On the other hand, the elimination of peremptory challenges
and professional exemptions perhaps could be limited to capital
murder cases, where the full voice of the community is especially
needed. Some members of the Court advocate the abolition of per-
emptory challenges altogether.' 8 6 In addition, some merit exists in
the notion that everyone should shoulder the civic responsibility of
jury duty regardless of their occupation.
3. Preserving the Integrity of State Law
The strongest interest that a state could offer is maintaining the
integrity and viability of its death penalty laws. The Court in both
Adams and Wainwright held that the state may pursue this interest by
requiring jurors to apply the law as charged by the court.'8 7 The
Court has stated that excluding a juror is permissible if his or her
views "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' 88
To apply the law as charged, ajuror must be able to vote guilty
in a case that may result in the imposition of the death penalty. A
person who so adamantly opposes the death penalty that he or she
could not vote to impose it under any circumstances usually has
made a moral determination that it is morally wrong for the state to
put a person to death.' 8 9 Such a person would have to lay aside
such a moral imperative and participate in a process that could re-
of a capital murder trial. Rather, the court would have to make rulings that individual
doctors or sole proprietors were not so important that they could not be spared from
their ordinary pursuits. Such a ruling will certainly upset some people because it con-
flicts with their own self-perception. Whether the resentment that results is directed at
the state or the defendant, there is a danger that it would affect the impartiality of the
juror. The resentment would increase in proportion to a person's own sense of self-
importance, which may be greater in a professional person than in an hourly wage
worker.
186 "The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories in-
ject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating
peremptory challenges entirely." Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1726 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Were it necessary to make an absolute choice between the
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution com-
pels a choice of the former.").
187 " 'The State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts
impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court.' " Wainwright v.
Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
188 Id.
189 "Scruples against the death penalty are commonly the result of a deep religious
conviction or a profound philosophical commitment developed after much soul-search-
ing. The holders of such scruples must necessarily recoil from the prospect of making
possible what they regard as immoral." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 537
(1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
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sult in a person's death. 190 If the evidence showed guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, a Witherspoon-excludable would face two highly
undesirable alternatives. If he votes not guilty and hangs the jury,
he must go against his oath and his own sense of truth. Yet, if he
votes guilty, the resulting process could lead to the imposition of
the death penalty, which he considers abhorrent. The fact that
someone else might impose the death penalty does not change the
fact that a Witherspoon-excludable would first have to vote guilty. 19' If
the juror votes not guilty, his views have prevented the performance
of his duties in accordance with the instructions. At a minimum, the
dilemma substantially impairs the juror's ability to perform his
duties.' 92
190 See supra note 63.
191 Spinkellink v. Wainright, 578 F.2d 582, 595 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979). A purist might argue that anyone who faced such a moral dilemma would
admit that he could notjudge guilt impartially and remove himself from thejury. There
are two flaws with this argument. First, the argument may prove too much. Available
empirical studies may not reliably indicate how many people could insist on never im-
posing the death penalty and yet could be impartial in a guilt determination made "in
the shadow of the gallows." This group might be very small or conceivably nonexistent.
See Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An
Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11 n.42 (1970) (of 65 subjects
"strongly opposed" to capital punishment, only 49.2%o expressed disapproval of hypo-
thetical juror behaving as nullifier when nullifier convinced defendant was guilty). If
nullifiers automatically eliminate themselves at voir dire, then Lockhart will have little
effect on jury composition.
Second, the argument ignores the tendency of human beings to underestimate the
magnitude of such a dilemma until faced with it. Essentially, one must decide at some
point that a venireman's representations of impartiality are suspect. For this reason, the
court will not allow relatives or friends of the defendant to sit on juries, despite the fact
that some of them might be capable of impartiality. Similarly, the state's interest in an
impartial jury and the evenhanded application of its death penalty laws, see infra notes
192-96 and accompanying text, is too fundamental to risk by the inclusion of Wither-
spoon-excludables. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 596.
192 A basic tension exists between the view of the jury as an expression of the con-
science of the community, see l1itherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 (Douglas,J., concurring), and
the view of the jury as an enforcer of the law. This tension goes to the heart of the
Lockhart debate. See Note, Excluding Death Penalty Opponents fiom CapitalJnries: H'itt, lT'ither-
spoon and the ImpartialJuror, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 170-71 (1985). Some authors imply
that the function of representing community values should be preferred, even to the
point of defeating the law which is to be applied. See, e.g., W. WHITE, supra note 63, at
145 n.224. In this view, one of the legitimate functions of the jury is to inject an element
of lawlessness as a means of superimposing the full conscience of the community on the
law, perhaps as a means of effecting change in the law.
The opposing view emphasizes the jury's duty to enforce the law as it exists. "A
verdict on the evidence, however, is all an accused can claim; he is not entitled to a set-
up that will give a chance of escape after he is properly proven guilty. Society also has a
right to a fair trial. The defendant's right is a neutral jury. He has no constitutional
right to friends on the jury." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947).
This tension is reflected in the case law concerning non-death-penalty cases. See,
e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 310 (1880) (person with conscientious belief
that polygamy rightful may be challenged for cause in polygamy trial); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 147, 157 (1878) (same). But see King v. State, 287 Md. 530,
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Acceptance of the dissent's position would inject a higher de-
gree of arbitrariness into capital murder trials. If Witherspoon-ex-
cludables obstructed the guilt phase of capital murder trials,
determining a defendant's guilt and imposing the death penalty
could become a random process.193 Such a development would de-
stroy the Court's previous efforts to reduce arbitrariness in the im-
position of death sentences. t 94
The dissent's position allows a Witherspoon-excludable to im-
pede the implementation of the state's death penalty law. 195 Such
laws represent a legislative choice that no one person should have
the ability to override. The death penalty has little value if the state
cannot obtain a verdict of guilty. Therefore, Lockhart necessarily
preserves the death penalty as a viable alternative and upholds the
state's policy decision concerning capital punishment. The Court
has decided that states have the prerogative of making such policy
decisions.' 96 Therefore, it should not make collateral decisions that
might make these policy decisions inoperative.
C. The Effects of Lockhart
An inquiry into the effects of Lockhart is best conducted against
the backdrop of a model describing the distribution of attitudes to-
ward the death penalty in the general population. For example, a
study by Professor Jurow19 7 categorized people according to their
views of the death penalty and estimated the percentage of the pop-
ulation in each category. These categories were: 1) those who
would vote for the death penalty automatically (2%); 2) those who
generally favor the death penalty (5%); 3) those indifferent toward
535-37, 414 A.2d 909, 912-13 (1980) (court erroneously excluded veniremen favoring
decriminalization of marijuana in marijuana-related trial).
193 The Grigsby district court found that the ll'itherspoon-excludables amounted to
11% to 17% of the venire. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (E.D. Ark.), stay
granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc), rev'd sub nor. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Using 15% as a repre-
sentative figure, there is approximately a 14.2% chance of selecting a 12-man jury that
has no ll'itherspoon-excludables. See supra note 171. Such figures carry the potential that
"the imposition of the death penalty would be turned into a lottery, with the defendant's
winning ticket to be found at voir dire." Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 530 (8th Cir.
1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting), revtdsub iora. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
194 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (WhiteJ., concurring) (social
justification for death penalty legislation loses much of its force when, because of statu-
tory discretion vested injuries, the death penalty is so infrequently imposed that it is no
credible deterrent).
195 "In effect, one man on a jury who disagreed with [the state's] views concerning
the death penalty would be allowed to impose his will upon the rest of the citizenr"
regardless of the guilt of the defendant." Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d at 530.
1 '6 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
197 Jurow, .New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified"Jury on the Guil Determination
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1971).
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the death penalty (63%); 4) those who generally oppose the death
penalty (20%); and 5) those who would vote for life imprisonment
automatically (10%).198 Witherspoon attempted to restore the partici-
pation of the fourth group, which had been curtailed by statutory
exclusions for cause, in the sentencing decision.
At the time of Witherspoon, the distribution of attitudes regard-
ing the death penalty was markedly different from the pattern re-
vealed in Professor Jurow's study.' 99 A per se rule excluding all
scrupled jurors had such a severe effect that it had implications for
the cross-section requirement by virtue of the sheer-number of ju-
rors excluded. The Lockhart Court accommodated the massive shift
in public opinion by limiting the effects of Witherspoon.200
As a result of Lockhart, the Witherspoon doctrine has little effect
on the attitudinal composition of capital juries. Lockhart reaffirmed
statutory exclusions for those who would automatically vote for life
imprisonment (Group Five), preserving peremptory challenges that
the prosecutor otherwise would have used to exclude these individ-
uals. Consequently, prosecutors can peremptorily exclude more in-
dividuals who generally oppose the death penalty (Group Four).20 1
Furthermore, the Wainwright substantial impairment standard20 2
also may lead to exclusion of Group Four individuals for cause.
Trial court judges might resolve ambiguities in voir dire testimony
by excluding veniremen as Group Five persons when they really be-
long in Group Four.20 3 When these two factors combine, it is un-
198 This model is not exact, and there are probably overlaps between and gradations
within each category. Nevertheless, it is a useful device for discussion. In 1985, respon-
dents to a Gallup Poll gave the following indications as to when they thought the death
penalty should be allowed:
No Death
All Murder Cases Under Certain Circumstance Penalty
27% 57% 12%
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 147, at 181. Although the categories do not exactly correspond
to theJurow study, they are close enough to show that no massive shift in the categories
has occurred since 1971. In fact, the categories with a strong preference for the death
penalty have grown larger.
199 In 1966, only 42%o of those polled favored capital punishment while 47% op-
posed it. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.16 (1968). Since then, the death
penalty has steadily increased in public favor. In 1985, 72% favored the death penalty,
while only 20% opposed it. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 147, at 175, 178.
200 See hifra section III(D) for a discussion of how further attitude shifts might be
reflected in future court decisions.
201 See Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptoy Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study atnda ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982). Professor Winick concludes
from a study of jury selection in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit that the use of
prosecutorial peremptories results in a substantial underrepresentation of scrupled ju-
rors. Id. at 35-39.
202 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
203 "It thus 'seems likely that 1itt will lead to more conviction-prone panels' since
clear how many Group Four jurors will actually be included in petit
juries. Thus, while Witherspoon remains good law, actual practice
may negate its effect on jury selection. 204
Exclusion, however, also occurs at the other end of the attitude
spectrum. Witherspoon serves to exclude jurors for cause who would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty (Group One).205 In
addition, defendants probably will use peremptory challenges to ex-
clude many persons who generally favor the death penalty (Group
Two). Therefore, jury composition in death penalty cases largely
will consist of Group Three individuals, those indifferent to the
death penalty, with some additional persons from Groups Two and
Four.206
D. Implications for Future Litigation
Lockhart probably closes the issue of death qualification until a
significant shift in public opinion occurs that could instigate new liti-
gation based on one of two legal doctrines. First, if a large segment
of the population turned against capital punishment, and death
qualification excluded a significant portion of the venire, the Court
could draw on Witherspoon and Ballew to formulate a doctrine of
scope- or size-effect. Because Witherspoon remains good precedent,
it must stand for the proposition that any exclusionary practice re-
sulting in a severe reduction in the venire size can negate the pre-
sumption that the jury is drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. 20 7 Although the venire might represent a cross section
'scrupled jurors-those who generally oppose the death penalty but do not express an
unequivocal refusal to impose it-usually share the pro-defendant perspective of ex-
cludable jurors.'" Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Finch
& Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-QualifiedJuries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB.
L. REv. 21, 63 (1986)); see also Comment, Wainwright v. Witt and Death-Qualilfied Juries: A
Changed Standard But an Unchanged Result, 71 IOwA L. REV. 1187 (1986) (arguing that
Il'ainwright weakened constitutional limits on exclusion of scrupled veniremembers).
204 ll'itherspoon applies only to the sentencing phase, 391 U.S. at 522 & n.22, but
because most states with capital punishment laws use a unified jury, the llitherspoon ex-
clusion also affects guilt determinations. Similarly, any exclusion prohibited by l'ither-
spoon is reflected in the dynamics of the guilt determination.
205 See 1Iitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 536 (Black, J., dissenting) (juror who admits he has
scruples against not inflicting death sentence should be excluded); Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 55 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
206 In one of the cases examined in the Jurow studies, Group Four individuals actu-
ally had a higher propensity to convict than Group Three individuals. See Lindsay,
Prosecutorial Abuse of PeremptoiY Challenges In Death PenalY Litigation; Some Constitutional and
Ethical Considerations, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 71, 87 (1985) (graphical analysis of Jurow
data).
207 As discussed above, three possible bases exist for the l'itherspoon Court's finding
of partiality. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Lockhart refutes the possibil-
ity that partiality may be based on an imbalance of attitudes in the petitjury, see Lockhart,
106 S. Ct. at 1770, or on an infringement of the cross-section requirement due to the
exclusion of a limited number of persons holding certain attitudes, see id. at 1766.
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before jury selection, the exaggerated effect of exclusions at the se-
lection stage would make the cross-section guarantee ineffectual. 208
Such a view is consistent with the Ballew holding: practices that
have some negative impact on the workings of ajury will pass consti-
tutional muster only if the effects of those practices are not extreme.
In Ballew the significant factor was size; in a future death-qualifica-
tion case, the significant factor might be the excluded percentage of
the venire. In Witherspoon nearly half the venire was culled. 20 9 Simi-
larly, if death qualification began to exclude such a high percentage
of the venire, the Court might have to reconsider its position.
Second, the Court could formulate a new doctrine for death
penalty cases based on an expansion of the due process clause. If
Lockhart and Batson are to remain consistent, the reach of the four-
teenth amendment must exceed the sixth amendment guarantee of
impartiality when equal protection is implicated. Because the Batson
venire included blacks, and no juror was individually partial, the
trial fulfilled the requirements of sixth amendment impartiality as
defined in Lockhart. Yet, the Batson Court held that equal protection
prohibited the use of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges to af-
fect the racial composition of the petit jury. Similarly, the Court
remains free to decide that fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process requires that a defendant in a capital case have access to the
entire attitude spectrum of the community, even though the sixth
amendment guarantee of an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community does not so require. The Court is unlikely
to engage in such maneuvering, however, unless it is fairly certain
that public opinion necessitates a change.
A third possibility exists that could generate new death-qualifi-
cation litigation in the lower courts, but is unlikely to overturn the
result of the Lockhart decision. If death qualification begins to have
a severe, disproportionate effect on women or minority groups, op-
ponents of death qualification could argue it violates equal protec-
tion. Duren established that large divergences between the
percentage of such groups in the population and their representa-
tion in venires is unconstitutional. 210 Although cross-section analy-
208 Justice Powell's logic in Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986), see
supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text, might help bridge the gap between venire and
petit jury in such a scenario. It would be a mistake to assume that Powell's argument
would easily transfer, however, because Batson was an equal protection case, unbur-
dened with the venire/petit jury distinction that dominates cross-section cases. Death
qualification does not reflect on the ability of H'ithespoon-excludables to serve as jurors
generally and is not based on a stereotype but on an admission by the venireman.
209 See supra text accompanying note 56.
210 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977).
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sis is currently confined to venires, a broad exclusionary practice
that virtually eliminates a suspect or quasi-suspect group for cause
could generate an equal protection challenge. Batson demonstrates
that the Court will look beyond the venire to the petit jury when
equal protection is implicated. Under equal protection analysis,
however, prima facie challenges are rebuttable by proving absence
of intent to discriminate. 2 1' Death qualification is neutral on its face
and supported by several nondiscriminatory state interests. Espe-
cially after Lockhart, it would be very easy to show nondiscriminatory
intent.
CONCLUSION
In Lockhart v. McCree the defendant contended that death quali-
fication resulted in ajury that was both partial and unrepresentative
of a fair cross section of the community. He urged that the absence
of jurors unalterably opposed to capital punishment created a guilt-
prone jury that was too partial to satisfy the sixth amendment. Such
a definition of impartiality is unworkable in the context of current
practices of jury selection, and the Court properly rejected it. Fur-
thermore, it is illogical to apply a cross-section requirement to a
petit jury that cannot consistently represent a fair cross section of
the community because of its size and manner of selection.
Moreover, the state has adequate justification for any added de-
gree of attitudinal imbalance and/or unrepresentativeness intro-
duced by death qualification. A single jury capable of resolving both
the guilt and penalty phases of a trial may have advantages to a de-
fendant. The practices of allowing peremptory challenges and occu-
pational exemptions have legitimate state purposes that would have
been endangered by a contrary decision. More important, the ex-
clusion of persons adamantly opposed to the death penalty is neces-
sary to preserve the state's policy decision to enact a death penalty
law.
The use of peremptory challenges by both defendants and
prosecutors will tend to result in a jury that has no pronounced atti-
tudes concerning the death penalty. It is not clear that the defend-
ant is significantly disadvantaged by the selection of such a jury. In
fact, this jury constitutes the most neutral jury obtainable. Future
litigation in the area of death qualification will depend on a shift in
public sentiment. If death qualification begins to exclude so many
211 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (inter-
preting Court's position). See also McClesky v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (statistical
evidence that death penalty imposed most often when black defendant murders white
victim does not violate equal protection clause; defendant must show decisionmakers
acted with discriminatory intent in his case).
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jurors that death-qualified juries do not reflect a cross section of a
community, the Court could alter its position.
John A. Wasleff

